

































NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.








NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8002
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : __
FAILS T0_SW;TCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS



























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS




























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
u














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]


































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE - [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS






























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA: i_'_:_:::_ _;
BASELINE [ ]_ _







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN Loss OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS































NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS





















NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS










NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TEi
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS









































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
h
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
_NKSADATA:
BASELINE[ ]


















[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS





















NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.













LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TOSWITCHRESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
















NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
L
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ . ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO P_FORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES _SULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS


























NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]












NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.























NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
















NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] [P] Cp]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS




























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ].....












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN=_SS OF CCTVAND MISSION. Loss OF
ALLCAPABILIT_YTOPERFORMCCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSS!BLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW_ UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW vIsuAL INSPECTION AND RMS























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ............
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS






























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N fN ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITYTO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD PREVENT_S STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS





























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
L








NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS








































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8003
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[p] [p] [p] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV_CY EXIST_VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS




































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT_CIRCUIT COULD RESULT_IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS





























LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [p] [p]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY _QR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS














NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BAB_Iq_E _ [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







T._AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w
w























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS





















NASA FMEA #: I.i.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
[x]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 1.i.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 1.1.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.
ix]
[ ]




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE






NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ 3
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










































NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.
















BASELINE [ ] _
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.


































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.


















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
P] [P ] [ P ] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If appiicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.



















NEW [ X _]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA_ .........
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE

















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]























LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C 1
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.





NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6
NASA DATA:
-BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8004
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY THE WORST CASE













LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _..............





















NASA FMEA #: i.I.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ _ [ _ [ X _ *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU


















NASA FMEA #: i.i. I0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] Cp] Cp]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: i.i.ii.i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSSOF=OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
i





NASA FMEA #: 1.1.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU


































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









C P ] [ P ]
CP] [p]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU


























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2
NASA DATA:
BAS EL I_-E [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT





NASA [ 3 /1R ] i ] *





COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORTCIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OFf
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU


































NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU













NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w
w





NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SNORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU

























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w








NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU

























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_KS :
INTE_AL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORTC;RCUITCOULDRESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COORS ALL RCU




























NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.





ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005BB BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ i_
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU





























TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
u







NASA FMEA #: 3.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)






HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:(If=applicable) ...............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
n
























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




















































NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
m
__4
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.






















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w






NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.






























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.











TV CAMERA (FLT DECK).




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ . ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] C ] C ]
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





























NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.











TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3,1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






































TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w







NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".



































TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.











TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














C ] C ] C ] C
[ ] C ] C ] [
[ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
m





NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w






NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
B_SELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmc A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























TV CAMERA (MID DECK)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] C ] C ] C ] *
] C ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .........
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA (MID DECK)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




C ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




































TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)





NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.











TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND •
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, ........
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW













NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD2DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RE SUL T IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL ....
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, _ i
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW



































TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.











TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)










HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW























TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW






























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
m






NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW

























TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW



































TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA: I
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w
















TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8008




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C -
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.






NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
CO.ARE [ /N ] C N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL _ _
CAPABILIT_'T0 PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD P_T RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW































TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)







[2/2 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW









NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RM& JETTISON TO ALLOW



















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
w







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW&a2160HVI_RECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW


































TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
r











TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND mS JETTISON TO ALLOW



















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.







NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD P_q_T RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW





























TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
INADEQUATE [x]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS,
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.




















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)











[2/2 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REMARKS :
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ _ ....
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUNCT_OS_.OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.














TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.






















NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






fromRECOMMENDATIONS: (If different NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, "
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW





























NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
w







NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA: _ _
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW

















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.








NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CiL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _i_......._
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW

























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] CP]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[X] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_SS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. -_ss OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW




















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.







NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW















NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ...........
[p] EP] [P]
[p] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)














[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
z
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.








NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W. C • LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW





































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.







NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW














NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ }_
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 8011
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC AB C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV _CTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IoA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO P-_FORM CCTV _ COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIB_ _SS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW




















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING3816R_NSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.






NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW


















NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
















NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C "
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
8011
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] {




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
ONLY THE WORST CASE







NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA FMEA #: 5.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
CADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
=







NASA FMEA #: 5.1.2
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8012
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST







NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C .......
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE_"
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. _:
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD




















NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.






NASA FMEA #: 5.1.5
NASA DATA: _
BASELI_ [ ........]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC QUTPUTRESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL F_CTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD






















NASA FMEA #: 5.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.













TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC ouTPuT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD


























NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.














TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD































NASA FMEA #: 5.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.







NASA FMEA #: 5.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD





















NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.






NASA FMEA #: 5.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD































TV CAMERA RMS WRIST





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]















TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 5.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS WRIST




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


































TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w













TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW











N_A [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_SS=OF=_C oUTOUTCOULDRESULT IN_DUCEDMISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW _C NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL F_CTIONS AND _IST _C
PROVIDES P_TIAL _D_DANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. _LI_
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPE_ION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_ ELBOW _C _NCTION
























TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.











TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW










NASA [ 2 /2 J [ J [ ] [ ] [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF _C 0UTOUT _OUL_ RESULT IN _DUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND _iST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION



























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.






NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION






























TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.







NASA FMEA #: 4.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
Loss OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND_COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
























TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.







ASSESSMENT ID: _ COMTRK-8013I
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.5
NAS_ DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] [ ] C ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVCOUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDU_EDMISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USEDTOMONITOR CRITI_L FUNCTIONS _NDWRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT






























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.






NASA FMEA #: 4.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT































TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.
r_







NASA FMEA #: 4.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING


























NASA FMEA #: 4.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.
r







NASA FMEA #: 4.1.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW









[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
































TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 4.3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














(If different from NASA)
] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

















PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE ANDCREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDU/¢DANCYEXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS



































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P-] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOORCLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ]. [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
































NASA FME #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w






NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ....
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]. [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS V!A CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS



































PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
B_ELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS






















NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK .....
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK .....
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL



























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IDA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.....ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CAD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKECCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL
































NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.












COMTRK-8015I BASELINE [ ]
2.4.4.1 NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDU_NDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
-- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
-- RRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.








NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION

































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT. UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _:_
8016
PANAND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)





NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C





[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION


























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]







PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW vIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION




































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.














PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION


































PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.









NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






• PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN _SSOF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT MS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
V_ICLEAND C_W_ _LIKE CCTV_D_D_CY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION



























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
w








NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN Loss OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
oF-CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_EVAAND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
__ELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. _UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW vIEWING, EVA _D_ coAS-_FOR -_CR_ VISUAL INSPECTION











































NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8018
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.








NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C












RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION



















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE4392H[]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
w









NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION


























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION



























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. -
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION

























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P _] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
E_TIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATIONCOULDRESULT IN LOSSOF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL


























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.i
NASA DATA:
.....BASELINE [ ] ....._ _












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITT_T OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA 6R_ WINDOW VIEWIN_ _EVA _COAS_0R cREW _SUA_ !


























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[p] [p] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.




ASSESS_T ID: : CO_RK-8019E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA." ...........
BASEL_ [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG :_
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ............... _
_TIC/iNTE_TTANT OPERATI0_--- COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VZA CREW %rfND_W VIEWING, EVA KND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






































NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8019

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA: _
........._ELINE _ [ .....] _ ....






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONTTORIHG P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES _SU_LTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREWJ UNLIKE CC_ REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VI_ C_ WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND C_FO_ CREW VISUAL
























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[p] [p] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.














; _ASELINE [ _ ]
NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABIL_ITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL



























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA: ......._ ...





COMM AND TRACK ......
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXIS_VIA _W WI_D0W_VIE_NG, EV__C0AS FOR CREW VISUAL


































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1








PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFOI_4_CTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3





NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL



































NASA FMEA #: 2'1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_RMC_=_CTIONCOULD RESULT MS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY _OR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL




























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.














NEW [ X ]
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)








NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [p] IX]









RE COMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVAAND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL











NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
_SS 0?_LL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ccTV_NcT-ION--COULD RESULT I_S
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
_SS QF_VEHICLE AND C RE_ UNLI_CC_DUNDANCy ............. _
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIE_NG, EVA AND COA S FOR CREW VISUA_





































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.











NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If dlffer-ent from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 12 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL



















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DAT_: _
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL




































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.












NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY _SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL

































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL









NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PH-YSiCA-L BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS O_CCTV AND MISSION. _SS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHIC_DCREW_ UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCy .....
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL

































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: _ _?_ _ _:
BASELINE [ ] _




COMM AND TRACK ._ _ ._ _.
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






















NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF AL_L_CAPABILITY TO PERFbRM-C-CTV FUNCTION COULD PREVEN T IRM_ STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
u





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[p] [P] [P] [x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF AL_ _CAP_%_tITY _TO PER_O_ Cd__d_iON C0ULD P_Ve_ _m_S stow
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS_VI_A_CREW WiNDO°W _VIEW_ING, EV__ _ COAti'FOR _CREW VISUAL i





































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C _ _
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL















NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL






























NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
cRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS -CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ccTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS_A CREW WINDOW_VIEWING_ EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL












NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERF0_ CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR ] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
w














COMM AND TRACK _
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]






RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
w






NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
....FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _-
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[p] [p] [p] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMI_T OPE_TIQNC_LD_RESULT IN_S_FCCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL



























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /I R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORIN_P-/LB_AYDOORT__TCHESRESULTIN_LIN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREWWINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CC_ AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION ANDRMS JETTISON TO ALIJOWP/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. -WORST
CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BA_SELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY_TOPERFO_ CCTV_FUN_iON COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING •IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHIC_ANDCREW_ UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS F6R_CREWVISUAL














NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
• INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL









NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:i _
BASELINE [ ]




COMMAND TRACK_ _ _
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITT_T, OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PER_6_RM_6d_ _ION_COUtD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW, UNLIKE_ CCTV REDUNDANCY .........
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COA$ FQR CREW_SUA_


































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8026
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDA/_Y SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
T_ OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.






NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS 0FTVCOUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT






















NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR INRMS STOW.
w







NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.2
NASA DATA: _- _
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE ..........
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWI--NG, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT


























NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)








NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.







NASA FMEA #: 4.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTUFAILURE TO MO_ RESULTS iN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
_DUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT































NASA FMEA #: 4.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.







NASA FMEA #: 4.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT








































NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.
L__









NASA DATA. _ -_i_: :_::
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8027
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANcY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ p] [ P] [P] [x] *
[P] [P] [p] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS QF TVC
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTI_NESS. E_LBOWLTVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIALREDUNDANCY FOR MISS__ON SUPPORT. UNLIKE _'_
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA_D COAS FOR _EW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT

















NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE)




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.












ITEM: PAN AND TILT _IT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL_DUNDANCY=FOR MISSION SUPPORT_UNLI_ ......
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREg_
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT































PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
=
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
L
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.















PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS ViA CREW WINDOW $iEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL cAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT








































PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.







NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3
NASA DATA:






COMM AND TRACK .....
8028
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
w.c. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO _ PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT



















NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] _ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w














MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV













































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
F















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















































MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
;= (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.6.6.2
NASA DATA: ___
BASELINE [ ]





COMM AND TRACK _- _
8032
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV


































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. -
Lb_SS OF OUTPUT C6_D CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AhqYMISSION, LOSS OF ALL
CAPXB'ILI_ TO _ PERF_C_ FUNCTION Co[;LD-P_" P/4S_ S_AND ....
MONITORING: P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES REStrSTING IN POSSTBLE _LOSS OF -
VEHICLE _D CREW. UNLi_ _C_ REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW vIEWING, EVA ANDCOAS FOR _FISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] [N]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.




























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE_QFCCTV_D=MSSSIQ_.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND




























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.












NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _± _ _ _ _
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS O? _OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY To PERFORM cc_ FUNCTION cOULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND




































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ...... ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]





COMM AND TRACK .....
8036




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /2 ] [ IR] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION'
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTVFUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAST FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND




























NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS DF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS _FOR CREW VISU_INSPECTION ANDRMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ......
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
_AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OU_PU_ CouLD" cAUsE _sS _0F C'CTg_-AND _ MISSION' _ LOSS OFALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION Cb_I__Ng°RMSSTOW _
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE eCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING_ EvA _D=COAS_FOR _ _W_IS_L INSPEC_0_ AND _S





































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_..... ADEQUATE [ X ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CC_ _cTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND



































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON











NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ _ ..... :_
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
_S$_oOF OUTPUT_ COULD _CAUSE _SS OF C_TV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS sToW _D_
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
w
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _: :......:_ _;_ _! _ _-
8040
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS _CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ___,_ _ __
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONCOULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
















NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. _IST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST
CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
[N] [N] IN]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL
FUNCT!ONS_DELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AN_D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL IBS_ECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST

























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMTRK-8041B
5.1.6.3
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8041
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















COMM AND TRACK i_±_ _ - _ _
8042
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)







A B C _
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] IN] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF MLA OUTPUT. LOSS OF
MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED MISSION
EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION
SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA
AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST






























NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.





NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L.BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION_NEFFECTIVENESS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD




































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CO_-8043B
4.1.6.3
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8043
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8044
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)







A B C _:_
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD






































WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]....






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
a
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO





























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] i[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C









































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COORS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.






NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3
NASA DATA:












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8045
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

























NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
w




ASSESSMENT ID: C O_MTRK-8045I
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
NASA DATA: _.-_.
-BASELINE [ _] ....






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO



























NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
q
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C














NASA _A #: 4.3.8.2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO






























NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA_ ......
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8046




NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV



















NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
cIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.














NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8046
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO



























NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
m
w





NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO_LLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO




































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8047
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
































WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.
ix]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.
(If applicable)
























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
F















NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK _
8047




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :























NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.







NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE).
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO


















NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
!
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
b
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] E ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
































WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA: :_
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]'
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO






















NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8048
WIDEANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
r_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] '[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
r_





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmc A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO






























WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8048





C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
C ] C ] C ] C ]
[ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
























NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] [ ][ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
=





NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MiD DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
•(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
















NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.
w














WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO






















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8049
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ] C
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

































NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
w.
= .














NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8050
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV





















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.
L
m






NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 211R]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ](ADD/DE_T_)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR C LOS_E. WORST CASE CONDITIONS.















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOWAND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND


















COMM AND TRACK _
8054
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_NG COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY To PERFO_ CC_ _NCTION COULD PREVENT'RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND



































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.






NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE


































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)










[3/3 ] [ ]
[2/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[p] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO P_ERF6RM CCTV FUNCTIbN_COULD PREVENT mS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE




























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION.LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS
VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND



















NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASECONDITION WAS ANALYSED.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8057




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COASFOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
w





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_INGCOULD CAUSE LOSS QF CCTV_ANDMISSIQN.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM_Ct_ FUNC_ C0ULD PR_ MS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE_ CCTV RE_D_DA_Y EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDO#VIEWING, EVA _D COAS F0R CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BaY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE




























NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P 3 [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CC_ FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D
RMS JETTISON TO ALLow P/L BAY DOOR CLOS_E. WORST CASE
































NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIoN AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.












COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C L
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPU COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.









NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.







NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET E )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING iN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNL_IKE_ CCTV _D_DAN_CY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE





















NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT
USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FuNcTIoNS _D ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL
REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW wINDo_vIEWiNG, EVA _b-COAS'F6R C_WgisuAiiNSP_Ti_N. _
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
w














NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC
OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT
USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL
REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR C_W VISUAL INSPECTION.




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
w







NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.2
NASA DATA:
BA_SELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ ...... _
8061
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST _C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.

























NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ P ]
REMARKS:
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ P ]
REMARKS:
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD


























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSS OF CLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.





NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C 1 _i 'ill
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS-. (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF CLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF Tvc 0UTPUT.
OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC
NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF TVC














COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w










COMM AND TRACK .... _ < _
8063
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
NASA P_T_I
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
.. _!== =




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LQS_ QF 0UTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION _ LOSS OF SYNC NOT
ANALYSED.
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELB0WTVC FUNCTION COULD




























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 4.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
....._SELINE [......] ....







COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT|
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PHYSICAL BINDING/J_IN _G _E_L!_ IN_ _SS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF
TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW
TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES
P_T!AL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUppORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND CO--AS FOR C_VISUAL
INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.






NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A _Y_ i_B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION.
IN AGREEMENT.
CRITICALITIES ARE















NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK ........
8065







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
A B C "_
C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-I091
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET _ _
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065E






NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ _ *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





























NASA FMEA #: 3.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
































NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
z _z
M RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

































NASA FMEA #: 3.5.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
w






NASA FMEA #: 3.5.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































NASA FMEA #: 3.5.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
ASSESSMENT:
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


































NASA FMEA #: 3.5.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.
w














NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8065
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





































NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :


























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
i [ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.






NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR








NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] C ] [
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8066








[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
l
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /
(If different from NASA)
J
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
z
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.








NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK :_ -_
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

























NASA FMEA #: 3.5.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8066





C ] C ] C ] C ] *
[ ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA FMEA #: 3.5.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 3.5.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

























NASA FMEA #: 3.5.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.






NASA FMEA #: 3.5.10
NASA DATA: ,
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ......
8066
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
Loss OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE




























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ....REDUNDANCY SCREENS elL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSE OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE

























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE











NASA FMEA #: 7.1.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POISING AND PICTURE
AD_S_ENTS DIFF_C_LT_IF_'NOT-IM-POSSIBLE RESULTING iN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE













































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
=
























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE






























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
z
=
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFIc-U-LT IF NOT IMPosSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE































NASA FMEA #: 7.1.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
w





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJU_ENTS _F-F!_LT IF NOT_I_OS_IBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE






















NASA FMEA #: 7.1.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.







NASA FMEA #: 7.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS QF CM _D PRESENTSoWQRST CASE
















NASA FMEA #: 7.1.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO_S-gF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CMWOULD MAKE TVC PQINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE







































NEW [ X ]




NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] [N] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULTIF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.







NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
L95_ OF OUTPUT FROMBOTH CMWOULD MAKE TVC POIN_TING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF vEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS CO_LDPOTEN_IAL_PROVIDEA_S_ST_CE TO DOWNGRADE




























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.
w








NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5
NASA DATA:_:_
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FRQM BOTH CM WOULD MA_TVC ,_OINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE









































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ...................
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIF?ICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE












































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RE COMMENDAT IONS. " (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH _ WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF-NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE











































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.





















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIF?ICULT-IF NOT_SSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE






























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
MAINTAINED.















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ __ -
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE






























NASA FMEA #: 7.1.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.
w
t















NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /!R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: r
LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN_SS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:







TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS
OF MISSION. A SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF CCTV AND ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:z_







TV PWR CNTLUNIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL SHORT/OPEN COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION. A
SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:







TV PWR CNTL SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
, (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD RESULT IN OPERATING IN PANEL OR CMD MODE
WHICH PRESENTS ONLY OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
w












TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]


















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:









































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.
r
w
















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. OPEN/SHORT PRESENTS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE HWICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.



















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
m







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA: _













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORTCOULD RESULT IN L_SS OF _AND MiSSIg._,....S_eO_DS GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY







































TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT CQULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. SECOND GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)




HDW/_c A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
RE_KS: ..............
OPEN/SHORT COULDRESULT IN LOSS OF TVCAND MISSION SECOND GCIL
CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:




TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]










CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY












































TV CAMERA POWER SW_TCH (RMS TVCS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT A CIL.
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF EITHER RMS WRIST OR ELBOW
TVC DEPENDING ON SWITCH POSITION. BOTH HAVE SAME CRITICALITY.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20409-I
NASA DATA:





COMM AND TRACK ......-_ _ -_: i:
8086
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN REDUCEDMISSION
EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO LOSS OF RMS TVCs WHICH DO NOT MONITOR
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON. LOSS OF RMS
TVC'S COULD

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20409-2
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION
EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO LOSS OF RMS TVCs WHICH DO NOT MONITOR
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON. LOSS OF RMS
TVC'S COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA: .......














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C _,_ ....
C ] C ] C ] [ ]*
C ] C ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ J ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
v








NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:








TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]










































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]



























[ ] [ ] [ ]
[2/1R2 [P2
[3/3] [ 3
IN] IN] IN]COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS






























NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.










NASA DATA: _ _:=:_
BASELIN_ [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8091
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH_INTAINS ELBOW OR _IST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS







































NASA FMEA #: 6.0.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _ _, _
8092




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICALOPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN _SS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING

































NASA FMEA #: 6.0.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
















RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[ ]
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LO$$OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING



































NASA FMEA #: 6.0.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
w
w







NASA FMEA #: 6.0.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMM AND TRACK _ :
8093





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH _!NTAINS ELBOW Q_WRIST TVC OPE_TION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS


























NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
w
c 7







NASA FMEA #: 6.0.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)





NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS




































NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8093








[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.
w
















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING



























NASA FMEA #: 6.0.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.
w






NASA FMEA #: 6.0.4
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ....
8094
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)








NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
c /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING

























NASA FMEA #: 6.0.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHNICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
NOT ANALYSED.














COMM AND TRACK _ ....
8095
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.






































TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
















TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS_CTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.







































TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.















TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO:_OMP_BLE NASA CCTV _EA. FAILU_ TO =PROVIDE THIS _TION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.


































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]


























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
h
















TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH




HDW/nmc A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMP_BLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAIL_ TO PR0VI_ THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





































TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH










NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
















TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMP_BLENASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS• FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.




































TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.


















TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] C ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
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